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U.S. Policy Recommendation: Ottawa Convention
on Anti-Personnel Landmines
by Trevor Holbrook*

he military purpose of anti-personnel landmines (APLs)
is to prevent or complicate access to specific areas
by killing or incapacitating enemy ground troops. 1
Unfortunately, the vast majority of landmines used in the last
several decades have been left in place following the end of
conflict, posing a grave threat to local populations. Today, more
than eighty million landmines remain active in over seventy
countries. Since the end of the Cold War, the international community and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have recognized the humanitarian crisis posed by landmines.
The scale of the landmine crisis is alarming and has both
direct and secondary impacts on affected communities. Since
1975, it is estimated that over one million people have been
killed or maimed by APLs, including hundreds of thousands of
children.2 Landmine victims become a burden on their families
because many can no longer work, and most require substantial
medical care. In addition to the physical threat these weapons
pose, their presence can have strong psychological effects and
can hinder development and economic opportunities. More so
than the mine itself, the threat of its presence is the underlying
cause of the humanitarian crisis. Mines Advisory Group founder
Rae McGrath states, “Any area suspected of being mined is a
minefield until proven safe.”3 The possibility of landmines can
prevent civilians from using farmland or traveling to another
village, reducing productivity and preventing trade. Moreover,
mine clearance is dangerous and costly, deterring investment
from mine-affected communities and preventing development.
These factors keep communities trapped in poverty and insecurity, and prevent a return to normalcy for decades after a conflict
ends.
In response to the alarming data regarding landmine casualties in the early 1990s, the International Committee of the Red
Cross (ICRC) declared an epidemic and began an advocacy
campaign to limit the suffering caused by these remnants of
war.4 Growing outrage, combined with media attention, led to
an unprecedented coalition of NGOs, intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), governments, and civilians calling for a global
ban on anti-personnel landmines.5 In 1997, 124 states signed
the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling,
Production, and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their
Destruction, otherwise known as the Ottawa Convention.6 The

Courtesy of Trevor Holbrook.

T

Introduction

Sign in Golan Heights, Israel warns of mines.

treaty combined provisions for arms control with requirements
for human protection under international humanitarian law
(IHL). The Ottawa Convention is aimed at eliminating the use of
landmines in order to protect civilians in accordance with human
rights law and IHL.7 Additionally, the Convention contains
requirements for mine clearance and victim assistance. The goal
of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) — a
global coalition of NGOs that assisted the passage of the Ottawa
Convention — and the Convention itself has been to eliminate
the humanitarian landmine crisis, both through international
cooperation in the humanitarian mine action8 effort and through
the stigmatization of military landmine use.
As the concern over the landmine epidemic gained momentum in the early 1990s, the United States was at the forefront of
the initial call for the ban. President Bill Clinton actively participated in the Ottawa Process9 leading up to the Convention,
but ultimately refused to sign due to pressure from the Pentagon.
Instead, President Clinton committed to developing alternative
weapons, then banning landmine use, and signing the Ottawa
Convention by 2006.10 However, following the administration
change in 2000 and the start of wars in Afghanistan and Iraq,
U.S. policy regarding landmines shifted as the international
military focus turned to terrorism. In 2004, President George
W. Bush announced that the United States would not sign the
Ottawa Convention and would continue to produce and stockpile
landmines. This stance has left the United States behind most
other states, which have continued to move toward a global ban
on landmines.
This article examines the consequences of the U.S. refusal
to sign the Ottawa Convention and examines the implications
of its continued refusal for the Ottawa Convention and customary international law. The United States has historically been a
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[T]he Ottawa Convention has been noted for its role
in successfully incorporating the concepts of human
security into the international legal framework. By using
humanitarian advocacy and involving NGOs in the
process, the Convention is the first treaty to eliminate
a tool used for the protection of national security
in favor of enhancing human security.
[T]o put an end to the suffering and casualties caused
by anti-personnel mines, that kill or maim hundreds of
people every week, mostly innocent and defenseless
civilians and especially children, obstruct economic
development and reconstruction, inhibit the repatriation
of refugees and internally displaced persons, and have
other severe consequences for years after emplacement,
believing it necessary to do their utmost to contribute
in an efficient and coordinated manner to face the challenge of removing anti-personnel mines. . . . 14

global leader and advocate for human rights and humanitarianism. In order to maintain this position, the United States must
acknowledge the trend within the international community
toward human security and protection and remain at, or at least
near, the forefront of human rights law and IHL. Furthermore,
continued U.S. refusal undermines the Ottawa Convention,
which like other international law instruments, garners validity
through consensus and mutual agreement. Without the support
of the world’s dominant power, the Ottawa Convention cannot
become customary international law; thus U.S. refusal provides
leeway for rogue states to continue the use and production of
persistent landmines.

While the Convention establishes specific timetables and
guidelines for disarmament, the most important provisions are
those that require states to clear all mines from their territories
and ensure an ongoing commitment to assist victims and threatened populations.15 Furthermore, reservations16 are not permitted under any circumstances, preventing states from maintaining
any existing minefields or stockpiles.

Ottawa Convention
The Ottawa Convention is considered unique in that the
global humanitarian community mobilized states in the effort
to ban a weapon that was actively in use throughout the world.
Eleven years after opening for ratification, the Convention has
156 States Parties, and international trade in landmines has virtually ceased.11 Civilian casualties are almost seventy percent
below levels reported in the early 1990s.12 While several key
states such as China, Russia, India, and the United States have
not signed the Convention, very few states have used landmines
in the last several years as a result of increasing stigmatization. Non-signatories to the Convention are very reluctant to
use mines because of the high political costs involved. In the
past five years, the only governments to deploy landmines were
Russia, Myanmar, and Nepal; all of whom used the mines within
their own borders to fight insurgencies.13
In terms of international law, the Ottawa Convention has
been noted for its role in successfully incorporating the concepts of human security into the international legal framework.
By using humanitarian advocacy and involving NGOs in the
process, the Convention is the first treaty to eliminate a tool
used for the protection of national security in favor of enhancing
human security. The preamble to the Convention highlights this
humanitarian focus in stating its purpose:

U.S. Landmine Policy and Its Implications
The U.S. government has defended its decision not to sign
the Ottawa Convention based on a number of factors. First, the
United States is, by a considerable margin, the world’s largest financial donor to humanitarian mine action, contributing
over $1.2 billion to activities in fifty countries since 1993. This
funding supports mine clearance training and work, local mine
risk education, victim assistance, mine-affected area surveys,
and destruction of stockpiles. In many ways, these U.S. efforts
surpass the requirements of the Ottawa Convention. Second,
the United States has committed to using only detectable, nonpersistent landmines that will self-detonate or lose power after a
short period of time.17 Although landmines have not been used
in any U.S. conflict since the 1991 Gulf War, the U.S. government still views landmines as an indispensable military tool.18
Third, the U.S. government argues that the Ottawa Convention
focuses too specifically on anti-personnel landmines while
ignoring other unexploded ordnance (UXO).19 The United
States maintains that the most effective method of controlling
the UXO threat to civilians is the creation and implementation of
responsible guidelines for their production, use, and subsequent
25
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minimize “collateral damage” to civilians during wartime, while
most concentrate on the main strategic objectives. The United
States maintains that the responsible use of landmines in conflict
situations is proportionately acceptable, in terms of military
value, weighed against the potential danger to civilians.
The humanitarian viewpoint, on the other hand, focuses on
the short- and long-term effects that landmines and other UXOs
have on civilian populations. The ICRC conducted a study22 of
the military effectiveness of landmine use and found that the
weapons were generally used in violation of international law
and that their use had minimal effects on the outcome of the
conflicts.23 Because the responsible use of landmines requires
substantial effort and organization, the ICRC concluded that
armed forces are generally unable to follow IHL when marking
and mapping landmines. Furthermore, because military operations focus on battlefield tactics, they often neglect to consider
the post-conflict consequences when planting mines. In other
words, battlefields often return to their use as crop fields, soccer fields, or playgrounds when conflicts end. The humanitarian
viewpoint acknowledges the numerous and considerable effects
that landmine presence can have on post-conflict recovery and
development.24
The presence of both viewpoints is evident in the complex
and contradictory arguments found in U.S. landmine policy. The
United States claims that, by remaining outside of the restrictions and requirements of the Ottawa Convention, it has more
freedom to dedicate efforts toward the greatest humanitarian
threats from all types of UXOs.25 However, this rationalization fails to recognize the value of international solidarity and
collective commitment. The primary purpose of the Ottawa
Convention is to highlight the importance of human security
under IHL by banning the use of anti-personnel landmines.
The United States acknowledges the existence of humanitarian
threats from UXOs, but has failed to recognize the importance
of the Ottawa Convention in the legal process toward eliminating
those threats. As illustrated by the recent Convention on Cluster
Munitions,26 the international community intends to eliminate
the humanitarian threat of persistent and indiscriminate weapons
through the introduction of human security into international
law. While both the United States and the international community claim to be concerned with reaching the same goal, the U.S.
has chosen to take a slow, incremental approach in opposition to
the international majority.
As a result of 12 years of competing priorities and lack of
determination, the United States is preventing the full eradication of the humanitarian landmine threat.27 Though it seems that
the trend toward human security in international law will continue to move forward without the support of the United States,
the refusal of such a dominant world power stands in the way of
the Ottawa Convention becoming customary international law
and significantly hampers the international protection of all victims from the threat of indiscriminate remnants of war.

Pile of landmines at the War Museum in Siem Reap, Cambodia.

removal. The Convention has been criticized for ignoring the
dangers related to anti-tank mines, cluster munitions, and other
UXOs.20 Fourth, the United States perceives the “mine-free”
target of the Ottawa Convention to be an inefficient and misguided goal. The intention of the comprehensive clearance goal
is to increase the international focus on mine clearance, while
ensuring that areas and villages are not overlooked. The United
States supports a “mine-impact free” goal which will eliminate
the threat of landmines in populated areas and transportation
routes,21 the method which it argues allows for the most costeffective clearance of mine threats.
Finally, the U.S. government has refused to sign the Ottawa
Convention because it does not allow for reservations. According
to the United States, the unique situation in the demilitarized
zone (DMZ) of the Korean peninsula requires the use of antipersonnel landmines in order to deter North Korean forces from
entering South Korea. Without landmines, a substantially higher
number of troops and weaponry would be required in Korea and
more lives would be at risk. As a result, the United States has
determined that the military necessity of landmines outweighs
the humanitarian benefits of a total ban on anti-personnel landmines.
Because the United States has been a strong advocate for
universal human rights in the past and initiated the call for a
landmine ban, it has been widely criticized for its refusal to
accede to the Ottawa Convention. The government clearly needs
to balance its competing expectations and requirements, but the
landmine issue has become politically volatile. The ICRC argues
that landmines are not an indispensable military weapon and
that their value is dramatically outweighed by their post-conflict
effects. The stigmatization of mine use has made their political
costs prohibitive. As international law moves into the arena of
human security, the United States cannot afford to sacrifice its
position in international affairs and international law to defend a
marginally useful military tool.
In order to examine the reasons behind U.S. landmine policy,
it is important to contrast the prominent military and humanitarian viewpoints on the issue. The military viewpoint stresses the
value of anti-personnel landmines in conflict situations. They
are considered “force multipliers” because they allow for the
protection of larger areas with fewer troops. During military
operations, active battlefields are viewed in terms of tactics
and strategic objectives. Traditionally, marginal efforts aim to

U.S. Policy Options
The policy that the United States chooses to follow regarding the Ottawa Convention has important implications, both for
human security and post-conflict development in future conflict
areas and for the framework of international law. Over the last
15 years, U.S. landmine policy has reverted from a progressive
to an increasingly ostracized stance. From its current position,
26
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the United States could follow one of three possible courses of
action regarding landmine policy: (1) continued adherence to the
current policy; (2) movement toward the standards set out on the
Ottawa Convention with an exception for the Korean peninsula;
or (3) accession to the Ottawa Convention.
If it adheres to the current policy, the United States will
continue to support humanitarian mine action on its own terms
by identifying high-risk areas and considering the costs and
benefits of removing landmines in remote areas. Continued
support for mine clearance training, mine risk education, and
victim assistance will continue to exceed the guidelines set out
by the Ottawa Convention. The military will produce and stockpile non-persistent, detectable landmines and retain the right
to deploy them in conflict. While it is highly unlikely that the
United States would use landmines in future conflict due to the
political consequences, the option will remain.
Following this policy will keep the United States at odds with
the global humanitarian movement and the international community, and will prevent greater acceptance of human security
and protection into international law. The Ottawa Convention
will remain partially effective and, although landmines will
become increasingly stigmatized, their use by rogue states and
non-state actors will continue to inflict suffering and obstruct
development.28 As the human security concept moves toward
the elimination of additional indiscriminate weapons and tactics
to prevent the suffering of innocent civilians, the United States
will be seen as supporting inhumane warfare as the government
continues to focus strictly on national security.
The second option would move U.S. policy in the direction of the Ottawa Convention mine ban, while maintaining an
exception for the situation in the Korean DMZ. The goals of the
Ottawa Convention would be strengthened to a small degree,
as U.S. disapproval of landmine use will further stigmatize the
weapon. Aside from Korea, it is unlikely that the United States
would use landmines in future conflicts due to the growing stigmatization. Therefore, producing and stockpiling these weapons
serves only to comfort military officials. However, it is unlikely
that additional countries would accede to the Convention, preferring instead to declare their own exceptions for continued use.
Such a trend of exceptions would mean that the landmine ban
would not be considered customary international law.
The third and most favorable option is a U.S. commitment
to accede to the Ottawa Convention before the end of the current presidential term in 2012. The military would be allowed
the next three years to develop alternative technology, while
maintaining access to current stockpiles in the meantime. The
Convention requires States Parties to remove all landmines in
the territories they control within ten years, allowing the United
States until 2022 to replace landmines in the Korean DMZ with
alternative weapons. By rejoining the rest of the progressive
international community, the United States could renew its com-

Three Republic of Korea soldiers patrolling the border at Panmunjeom
in the DMZ between North and South Korea.

mitment to human rights and IHL and cooperate in constructing
future treaties focused on human security. With the United States
as a State Party to the Ottawa Convention, the ban on landmine
use would approach customary international law. With the full
commitment of donor countries, the humanitarian threat of landmines would be significantly mitigated. Countries remaining
outside of the Convention would come under increased pressure
to accede, reducing the threat of landmine use to mostly nonstate actors. Because of the grave humanitarian threat posed by
landmine use and UXOs, the United States must acknowledge
that the civilian costs far outweigh their military value, and that
international solidarity is the best path to their eradication.

Conclusion
While the purpose of the Ottawa Convention is clearly in line
with the U.S. mission to support human rights and humanitarian action around the world, perhaps the most important reason
for accession to the Convention are the treaty’s implications
for the future of international law. While the United States has
supported the elimination of civilian landmine threats over the
last twenty years, it has also continued to insist on the tactical
military importance of indiscriminate anti-personnel landmines
and has developed its policy based heavily on the military
viewpoint. This insistence flies in the face of the international
community’s acknowledgement of the disproportionate humanitarian effect of such weapons and the successful introduction of
the human security concept into international law. Accession to
the Convention is in the best long-term interest of the United
States, allowing it to stay near the forefront of international
law. Possessing the technology and capability to develop new
weaponry, the United States must find an alternative to landmine
use in Korea. The cost of ignoring the international consensus
in order to maintain a fifty-year-old war zone is short-sighted
and in opposition to U.S. goals to spread freedom and improve
international security.		
HRB
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